Combining Texts

All the ideas for ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?st1=Michael Devitt', 'Disputed questions about truth' and 'Chapters on Scepticism'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]